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ARGUMENT
I.
POWER OF ATTORNEY
The personal representative argues, for the first time, that the Quitclaim Deed used by
George Perry to convey Martha's real property to himself (R. p. 99), was not a gift.
Respondent's Brief, p. 34. She points to the fact that the parties agreed no evidentiary hearing
was necessary and the deed was in the record. Respondent's Brief, p. 36. However, that
agreement was made after both parties had briefed the issues and no claim had been made that
the transfer of the property was anything other than a gift. Obviously, had the personal
representative made such a claim before Judge Bieter, the Department could have easily offered
evidence to refute it by simply calling the personal representative to the stand.
The reality is the personal representative, even here, doesn't claim George actually paid
Martha for the property. There is no evidence in the record that George had any money that was
his separate property to make such a purchase. Judge Bieter made no findings of fact relating to
any such a claim. Indeed, Judge Bieter, like both parties, treated the transfer as the gift it was.
Tr. (February 26, 2010) p. 11,11.8-13. At the same hearing, counsel for the personal
representative also treated the transfer as a gift. Tr. (February 26,2010) p. 9, 11. 4-5. Similarly,
the personal representative's entire argument before the District Court, relating to the power of
attorney, was based on her claim that the power of attorney authorized gifting. R. pp. 600-2.
Finally, the District Court ruled on the "authority to make gifts," not on any claim that
consideration had been paid. R. p. 709. The issue set forth by the District Court was, "Whether
the magistrate erred in determining that the general power of attorney held by George Perry gave
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him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real property." R. p. 706. That is the
issue the District Court ruled on. R. pp. 707-9.
At no time before the filing of Respondent's Brief in this Court did the personal
representative claim the transfer was anything other than a gift, and no finding or conclusion was
ever made on any such claim. "It is well established that in order for an issue to be raised on
appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of
error." Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 236,245 P.3d 983,
988 (2010). "Issues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered
or reviewed." Id.
In a footnote, the personal representative suggests that inferred spousal agency would also
support the gift by George to himself. Respondent's Brief, p. 43, fn. 36. The court below,
however, made no findings supporting such a claim, and correctly so; there was an express power
of attorney which gave George the power to deal with Martha's property - for Martha's benefit.
There was nothing in either the circumstances or the power of attorney which authorized George
to take Martha's property and give it to himself.
Finally, the personal representative argues that the power of attorney issue is not
dispositive because "on November 18, 2002, Martha executed a deed conveying a Yz interest in
the home to her husband George." Respondent's Brief, p. 34, fn. 26. However, that is not how
the deed was worded. The deed Martha executed shows the grantor as "Martha Jean Boyle" and
the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry & George Donald Perry," and conveys the property from
Martha Boyle to Martha Perry and George Perry. R. p. 134. This deed, presumably, made the
property the couple's community property. Idaho Code § 32-906. In any event, however, Judge
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Bieter made no findings with regard to the characterization of this property, and that issue
remains to be decided below. 1

II.
THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN IDAHO LAW AND
FEDERAL LAW.
A.
While Idaho Estate Recovery Law Is Unambiguous, the Federal Law Has Been the
Subject of Diverse Interpretations.
As discussed in prior briefing, Idaho law is clear in permitting recovery from the estate of
either spouse, so long as the assets are traceable to property that had been community property or
the property of the Medicaid recipient. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) is equally
clear in allowing the states to recover assets transferred from one spouse to the other. Subsection
(b)(4)(B) gives the states the option of expanding the definition of "estate," for purposes of
Medicaid recovery to
include, at the option of the State ... any other real and personal property and
other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor,
heir, or assign ofthe deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (underline added). As noted by the personal representative, Idaho
adopted this language "verbatim." Respondent's Brief, p. 8. The personal representative is
quick to point out that the language refers to "assets in which the individual had any legal title or
interest at the time of death," and contends that Martha's assets were conveyed to George.

IThe personal representative states that the Department never objected to the characterization of the property in
the inventory as separate property. Respondent's Brief, p. 3. However, from the very beginning, the Department
challenged the Quitclaim Deed by George to himself, as not eliminating Martha's community interest. R. pp. 127-30.
There is nothing in the probate code that requires a more specific challenge to the inventory.
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However, this argument ignores the definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) which
explains that the
... term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and resources
of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any income or
resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does
not receive because of action (A) by the individual or such individual's spouse ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) (underline added). Notice that this defines assets "with respect to an
individual." So when section 1396p(b)(4)(B) speaks of "assets in which the individual" had any
legal title or interest, it is referring directly to this definition, and includes assets that Martha
would have received, but for her own actions or the actions of her spouse.
While this construction seems clear and unambiguous to the Department, as pointed out
by the personal representative, some courts, such as the Minnesota Supreme Court in Estate of

Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008), have had difficulty with it. Admittedly, the Barg court did
not discuss the definition of "assets" in section 1396p(h), and therefore may not have considered
it at all. Likewise, the Solicitor General opinion, cited by the personal representative, argues that
the definition of "assets" in section 1396p(h) should not be applied to subsection (b). R. p. 86.
To the extent, then, that section 1396p is subject to such diverse, even opposing, interpretations,
it is ambiguous.
While the personal representative argues that the federal law is unambiguous
(Respondent's Brief, p. 25), she feels it necessary to ask the Court to consider the interpretation
of the Solicitor General and asks the court to defer to what she considers the interpretation of the
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federal Department of Health and Human Services. 2 Respondent's Brief, pp. 18-9. She further
asks the court to consider rules of statutory construction. Respondent's Brief, p. 20, fn. 13 and p.
27. Since such external aids of interpretation and construction would be unnecessary if the law
were unambiguous, the personal representative must necessarily agree that the federal statute is
ambiguous. It is legitimate, therefore, to examine the legislative intent and the purpose of the
law.
B.
Congress Intent to Track and Recover Assets Such as Those Here Could Not Be More
Clear.

Medicaid has always been intended to be the payer of last resort. Arkansas Dept. of
Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268,291, 126 S.Ct. 1752, 1767 (2006).
Congress has consistently sought to counter the attempts of some to use the Medicaid program as
an estate planning tool to protect assets for their heirs. The language ofthe congressional
committee, cited by the court in Cohen v. Commissioner of Div. ofMedical Assistance, 423
Mass. 399, 668 N.E.2d 769 (1996) is often quoted:
The Committee feels compelled to state the obvious. Medicaid is, and
always has been, a program to provide basic health coverage to people who do not
have sufficient income or resources to provide for themselves. When affluent
individuals use Medicaid qualifYing trusts and similar "techniques" to qualifY for
the program, they are diverting scarce Federal and State resources from
low-income elderly and disabled individuals, and poor women and children. This
is unacceptable to the Committee.

2 The Department does not agree that a brief by the Solicitor General is entitled to deference by this court In
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-3,109 S.Ct. 468, 473-4 (1988), the Supreme Court said:
We have never applied the principle of those cases [deference to agency interpretations] to agency
litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice. To
the contrary, we have declined to give deference to an agency counsel's interpretation of a statute
where the agency itself has articulated no position on the question, on the ground that "Congress has
delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating
and enforcing statutory commands."
(underline added).
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H.R.Rep. No. 265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1985).

Cohen, 423 Mass. at 403-4,668 N.E.2d at 772. The 1988 committee report for the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) echoed these same concerns:
The Committee is informed that a number of States have not made
effective use of the authorities under current law to prevent affluent individuals
from disposing of resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nursing home
coverage. In the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement program for
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing
home patients to their non-dependent children.
H.R. Rep. No. 105(II), 100th Cong., 1ST Sess. 1987, p. 73 (reprinted at 1988 u.S.C.C.A.N.
857,896,1987 WL 61566, p. 31) (underline added).
OBRA '93, discussed by the personal representative (Respondent's Brief, p. 5), included
provisions which expanded the powers of the states to recover Medicaid benefits. The intent of
OBRA '93 to track and recover assets not counted when determining eligibility, including those
transferred to the spouse, is clear:
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The program must identify
and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) of
individuals who receive nursing facility, home and community-based services,
and other specified long-term care services. The program must promptly ascertain
when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and must provide for
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the
individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the
surviving spouse. The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living
trust, or other arrangement.
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112. (emphasis added).
Congress's attempts to strengthen recovery of assets such as those here has not ceased. In 2006
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the president signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 giving the states additional tools to assure
couple's assets will be used for their own care or will be available for recovery, rather than being
protected for their heirs. The DRA included enhanced asset transfer penalties and restrictions on
annuities not directly in issue here.
C.

The Expanded Definition of "Estate" Is More than Sufficient to Reach the Assets Here.
The expanded definition of estate is, by its own terms, meant to be very broad. It uses

words such as "include" and "including," and phrases such as "any other ... property and other
assets," and "or other arrangement." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The term "assets" which is
incorporated into this subsection, is also defined very broadly using phrases such as "includes all
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse" and includes income and
resources the individual does not receive because of action by herself or by her spouse. 42
U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1).
The personal representative attempts to unnecessarily narrow this definition, arguing that
because there is a list of several transfers that occur automatically on death, only automaticallyon-death transfers are included. This distinction, however, is not found anywhere in the law.
Even among the listed transfers, not all occur at the moment of death. For example, when a
living trust is created the legal title is passed immediately. Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho
437,443,885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (App. 1994). The beneficiary holds only the beneficial, not legal,
interest, and no legal interest passes on death.
This also demonstrates that it is not necessary that the Medicaid recipient be the legal
owner of the property at the time of death. The words used by the statute are "legal title or
interest." Such an interest may be legal, equitable, or beneficial. Since the expanded definition
REPLY BRIEF - 7
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of estate includes the "resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse" and also
includes any "resources which the individual ... does not receive because of action ... by the
individual or such individual's spouse," Martha, by definition, had an interest in the couple's
home whether or not it was transferred to George.
This is the reasoning used by the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate a/Wirtz,
607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000):
Our inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz had "real and
personal property and other assets in which [he] had any legal title or interest at
the time of death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna Wirtz through "other
arrangement."
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1), asset is defined as:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income
and resources of the individual and ofthe individual's spouse, including
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse
is entitled to but does not receive because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such
individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
See Idaho Department a/Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970
P .2d 6, 9 (Id.1998) (concluding the definition does not apply to assets disposed of
on or before August 10, 1993).
Thus, the department can assert a claim against real or personal property,
and other assets in which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other interest at his
death, including income and assets conveyed through "other arrangement."

Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885 (underline added). The North Dakota Supreme Court then went on to
decide what the terms "interest" and "other arrangement" mean in the federal statute and
concluded:
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light
of the Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a
legislative intention to allow states to trace the assets 0/ recipients of medical
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assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse
dies.
We hold any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before
Clarence Wirtz's death and traceable to her estate are subiect to the department's
recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever
held by either party during the marriage. Cf Estate ofJobe, 590 N.W.2d 162, 166
(Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in which
the deceased recipient once held an interest will be traced. It does not provide that
separately owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in which the deceased
recipient never held an interest, are subject to the department's claim for recovery.
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (italics in original; underline added).3
D.

Recovery Here Is Not an Obstacle to the Purposes of the Federal Law.
As stated by the personal representative:
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is
impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143,83
S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the
state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67,61 S.Ct. 399,
85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).

Respondent's Brief, p.12. As noted above, however, the purpose of the law is to trace assets,
including those not counted in determining eligibility,4 and recover those assets after the death of
both spouses. There is nothing, either in the law or the legislative history, that suggests any
intention to preserve assets for the couple's non-dependent children. There is nothing in Idaho

Solicitor General amicus brief, cited by the personal representative does not disagree with Wirtz:
The different results reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court and the court below on
similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations of federal Medicaid law, but only different
views of when, under state law, a spouse retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her
spouse.
Solicitor General brief, p. 14 (R. p. 90). The Solicitor General does not mention the obvious fact that the Wirtz court
considered the definition of "asset" in section 1396p and the Barg court did not.
3The

4The personal representative acknowledges that the couple's home is not a countable resource in determining
eligibility. Respondent's Brief, p. 4, fn. 2.
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Code § 56-218 that presents "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."
On the other hand, interpreting the federal law as demanded by the personal
representative has perverse consequences. For example, Medicaid payments intended to ease the
burden on elderly couples become, instead, a windfall to their heirs. Unmarried Medicaid
recipients are placed at a disadvantage to married couples because a married Medicaid recipient
may pass her property to her heirs while an unmarried Medicaid recipient's assets must be used
to repay Medicaid. Unsophisticated couples who do not seek legal advice will leave nothing to
their heirs, while those who consult an attorney will convey their assets to the non-Medicaid
spouse and entirely avoid recovery. No, the purposes of both State and federal laws are met only
if the federal law is read to give purpose and meaning to the expanded definition of estate.

III.
ATTORNEY FEES
The personal representative seeks attorney fees on appeal contending that there is no
reasonable basis in fact or law to support the Department's claim. Even, however, should the
court find in favor of the personal representative, attorney fees would not be appropriate. Idaho
Code § 56-218 clearly permits the recovery sought here. If the federal law does not also clearly
permit the recovery, then it is, at best, ambiguous and the Department is not acting unreasonably
in giving it the same interpretation given by other courts including the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Wirtz.5

5 The Missouri Court of Appeals also gives the law the same meaning in In re Estate ofBruce, 260 S.W.3d 398
(Mo.App. 2008), where the court held that Missouri could not recover from the estate of the spouse only because it had
not adopted the expanded definition of estate.
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In Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 172 P .3d 1081 (2007), the
court explained that "if an agency's actions are based upon a 'reasonable, but erroneous
interpretation of an ambiguous statute,' then attorney fees should not be awarded." Ralph Naylor

Farms, LLC, 144 Idaho at 809, 172 P.3d at 1084; accord Matter ofRusset Valley Produce, Inc.,
127 Idaho 654, 661, 904 P.2d 566, 573 (1995).
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where the issue is a matter of
first impression, or other states have conflicting case-law, attorney fees should not be awarded
under Idaho Code § 12-117. Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Labor, 148 Idaho 72, _ , 218 P.3d 1133,
1137 (2009); see also Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 862,
863,204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009) ("Because the issue of standing presented a question of first
impression under the amended statutes, we conclude that Ada County did not act without a
reasonable basis in law"); Kootenai Medical Center ex ref. Teresa K v. Idaho Dept. of of Health

and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872,886,216 P.3d 630, 644 (2009) (attorney fees on appeal declined
where the case involved issues of first impression in an Idaho appellate court); State, Dept. of

Finance v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 282, 285, 1 P.3d 783, 786 (2000) ("based upon
the lack of case law of this state in addition to supporting decisions from other jurisdictions, that
the Department was not without a reasonable basis in fact or law in bringing and maintaining
suit").
There is more than a reasonable basis for the Department's claim for recovery in this
matter.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
The power of attorney used by George to convey Martha's property to himself contained
no authority for self dealing or making gifts and was insufficient to support the purported transfer
to himself. There is no conflict between Idaho Code § 56-218 and federal Medicaid law. The
order of the Magistrate disallowing the Department's claim should be reversed and the
Department's claim should be allowed for payment according to its priority under the probate
code.
day of October, 2011,

DATED this

~~~~-=:xf-'~
Deputy Attorney General
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